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“BUT MY LEASE ISN’T UP YET!”: FINDING FAULT WITH “NO-
FAULT” EVICTIONS  
Eloisa C. Rodriguez-Dod∗ 
This Article critically examines the eviction of tenants for actions or 
events outside of the tenants’ control—“no-fault” evictions. For exam-
ple, tenants may be evicted because the landlord’s property was fore-
closed, the landlord wants to re-occupy the property, or the landlord 
wishes to sell the property to a purchaser who intends to occupy it. This 
Article analyzes and critiques the common law, statutes, and proposed 
uniform acts that may permit evictions of tenants from private residential 
dwellings under such circumstances. In addition, this Article discusses 
the necessary balance between a landlord’s rights and obligations and 
those of a tenant, and offers recommendations. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most complex areas of landlord tenant law to analyze is 
“no-fault” evictions because it raises significant legal issues that intersect 
property, contract, sales, and foreclosure laws and systems. The author first 
considered these issues as a panelist at the 2013 Ben J. Altheimer Symposi-
um (“Symposium”). This Article expands on the Symposium discussion, 
recommends that the Revised Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act 
(“RURLTA”)1 contain provisions clarifying this area, and suggests concrete 
considerations for such proposed provisions. 
  
 ∗ Eloisa C. Rodriguez-Dod, Professor of Law, Florida International University Col-
lege of Law, Miami, Florida. My deepest gratitude to Symposium Editor Kitty L. Cone, Edi-
tor-in-Chief Abtin Mehdizadegan, and the other editors of the University of Arkansas at 
Little Rock Law Review and their advisor, Professor Lynn Foster, for organizing and inviting 
me to participate in the 2013 Ben J. Altheimer Symposium (the “Symposium”) panel titled 
“A Question of Balance: 40 Years of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act and 
Tenant’s Rights in Arkansas.” I would also like to thank keynote speaker, Professor Dale 
Whitman, and Symposium panelists Professor Alice Noble-Allgire, Douglas Smith, Esq., 
Professor Donald Campbell, Professor Elena Marty-Nelson, Professor Melissa (Missy) 
Lonegrass, and Lawrence McDonough, Esq., whose comments helped me refine my Article. 
Lastly, I am grateful to my research assistants, Aubrie Brake, for her superb work in helping 
me prepare for the Symposium, and Latoya Brown, for her exceptional work in helping me 
with the drafts of this Article.  
 1. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is currently in 
the process of revising the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (“URLTA”). As of 
the date of submission of this Article, there were three drafts of the revised URLTA. REVISED 
UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT (Sept. 17, 2012), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Residential%20Landlord%20and%20Tenant/2012s
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In 1969, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (“NCCUSL”) undertook the task of drafting reform landlord tenant 
legislation.2 Among its goals, NCCUSL wanted to “[i]nsure tenants the right 
to occupy a dwelling as long as they fulfill their responsibilities.”3 Three 
years later, in 1972, NCCUSL approved the Uniform Residential Landlord 
and Tenant Act (“URLTA”).4 Subsequently, twenty-one states adopted 
URLTA or a modified version.5 
Forty years after promulgating URLTA, NCCUSL formed a new draft-
ing committee (“Drafting Committee”) to undertake a comprehensive 
revision of URLTA.6 NCCUSL recognized that “there have been many 
new statutory and common law developments that affect residential landlord 
and tenant law,”7 many of which are disparate or conflicting.8 In addition, 
the study committee noted that some states still had no laws in effect regard-
ing certain landlord tenant issues.9 To achieve greater uniformity among the 
  
ep17_URLTA_MtgDraft.pdf [hereinafter September 2012 RURLTA Draft]; REVISED UNIF. 
RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT (Jan. 28, 2013 Draft), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/residential%20landlord%20and%20tenant/2013jan
28_RURLTA_MtgDraft.pdf [hereinafter January 2013 RURLTA Draft]; REVISED UNIF 
RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT (Apr. 2, 2013 Draft), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/residential%20landlord%20and%20tenant/2013apr
2_RURLTA_MtgDraft.pdf [hereinafter April 2013 RURLTA Draft]. 
 2. Residential Landlord and Tenant Act Summary, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Residential%20Landlord%20and%20T
enant%20Act (last visited Mar. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Act Summary]. 
 3. Id. 
 4. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT (amended 1974), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/residential%20landlord%20and%20tenant/urlta%20
1974.pdf. 
 5. The following states have adopted URLTA in whole or in part: Alabama, Alaska, 
Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Virginia, Washington. See Legislative Fact Sheet—Residential Landlord & Tenant 
Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx 
?title=Residential%20Landlord%20and%20Tenant%20Act (last visited Mar. 5, 2013) [here-
inafter Legislative Fact Sheet]. 
 6. See Memorandum from Sheldon F. Kurtz, Chair, Study Comm., Unif. Law Comm’n, 
to Scope and Program Comm., Unif. Law Comm’n at 24 (May 18, 2011), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/residential%20landlord%20and%20tenant/urlta_stu
dycmtereport_051811.pdf [hereinafter Study Committee Memorandum]. The first meeting of 
the newly formed committee was held on March 9–10, 2012. See Unif. Residential Landlord 
& Tenant Act (20__) Drafting Comm., Unif. Law Comm’n, March 2012 Committee Meeting 
Agenda, available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/residential%20landlord%20 
and%20tenant/urlta_mtgagenda_mar12.pdf. 
 7. Committees: Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Committee.aspx?title=Residential%20Landlord%20and%20Ten
ant%20Act (last visited Mar. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Committee Description]. 
 8. See Study Committee Memorandum, supra note 6, at 23. 
 9. Id. 
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states,10 the Drafting Committee was charged with “seek[ing] to codify best 
current practices in a revised act.”11 
A Drafting Committee memorandum noted that five issues related to 
evictions were not addressed in URLTA: “(1) the bases for eviction,12 (2) 
required notice periods, (3) eviction procedures, (4) defenses to eviction, 
and (5) treatment of an evicted tenant’s personal property after eviction.”13 
Accordingly, one of the many issues the Drafting Committee is tackling is 
whether to include provisions regarding evictions in the draft of RURLTA.14  
In addition, the Drafting Committee is working on proposed revisions 
of the section in URLTA on retaliatory evictions.15 Commendably, the 
Drafting Committee expanded the grounds upon which a landlord could not 
refuse to renew a lease for retaliatory motives.16 It also, however, expanded 
  
 10. Id. 
 11. See Committee Description, supra note 7. 
 12. In fact, URLTA includes in its provisions the following reasons for which a landlord 
may evict a tenant: 1) nonpayment of rent; 2) material noncompliance by the tenant with 
provisions of the rental agreement; 3) tenant’s failure to maintain the premises materially 
affecting health and safety; and 4) holdover tenant. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT 
ACT §§ 4.201, .301 (amended 1974). Because termination of a lease may lead to either a 
voluntary or involuntary eviction, this Article may use the terms “termination of lease” and 
“eviction” interchangeably. See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text (discussing “volun-
tary” evictions). 
 13. Memorandum from Sheldon F. Kurtz & Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Co-Reporters, 
Unif. Residential Landlord & Tenant Act Drafting Comm., Unif. Law Comm’n, to Unif. 
Residential Landlord & Tenant Act Drafting Comm., Unif. Law Comm’n 1 (Sept. 13, 2012), 
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org /shared/docs/Residential% 20Landlord%20and%20 
Tenant/2012sep13_URLTA_Memo_EvictionSurvey.pdf [hereinafter Eviction Survey].  
 14. See id. The September 2012 RURLTA Draft included a blank Article 10 titled 
“Evictions,” with a note stating: “TO COME.” See September 2012 RURLTA Draft, supra 
note 1. However, both the January 2013 and April 2013 drafts of RURLTA failed to include 
a similar blank Article indicating whether evictions will be addressed in RURLTA.  
 15. See Memorandum from Joan Zeldon, Drafting Comm. Chair, Sheldon Kurtz, Re-
porter, & Alice Noble-Allgire, Reporter, Unif. Residential Landlord & Tenant Act Drafting 
Comm., Unif. Law Comm’n, to Comm. of the Whole, Unif. Law Comm’n 1–2 (June 10, 
2013), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Residential%20Landlord%20 
and%20tenant/2013AM_RURLTA_IssuesMemo.pdf. “Retaliatory evictions” refers to retalia-
tory conduct by a landlord. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1316 (9th ed. 2009). Although the 
landlord’s conduct itself does not constitute an actual eviction, the landlord’s actions conse-
quently may, and often do, lead to a tenant’s eviction. See infra Part IV.C.  
 16. Section 5.101 of URLTA stated: 
(a) Except as provided in this section, a landlord may not retaliate by increasing 
rent or decreasing services or by bringing or threatening to bring an action for 
possession after: 
(1) the tenant has complained to a governmental agency charged 
with responsibility for  enforcement of a building or housing code of 
a violation applicable to the premises materially affecting health and 
safety; or 
 
842 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
the reasons for which the landlord could refuse to renew the tenancy and 
recover possession.17  
This Article explores certain instances when a landlord may evict a 
tenant for actions or events that are outside of a tenant’s control: (1) the 
dwelling is subject to foreclosure, (2) the landlord wants to sell the premis-
es, or (3) the landlord desires to occupy the property for personal use. In 
addition, this Article analyzes the related issue of when a landlord can avoid 
prohibitions on retaliatory evictions under some of these scenarios.18  
  
(2) the tenant has complained to the landlord of a violation under 
Section 2.104  [landlord’s duty to maintain premises]; or 
(3) the tenant has organized or become a member of a tenant's union 
or similar organization. 
UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 5.101(a). The Drafting Committee has ex-
panded the section on retaliatory conduct to read as follows:  
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a landlord may not retaliate 
against a tenant by taking one of the actions described in subsection (b) because 
the tenant has: 
(1) complained [in good faith] to a governmental agency responsible 
for the enforcement of: 
(A) a building, housing, or health code violation appli-
cable to the premises; 
(B) laws or regulations prohibiting discrimination in 
rental housing; [or] 
[(C) governmental housing, wage, price, or rent con-
trol]; 
(2) complained in good faith to the landlord of a violation under Sec-
tion 303 [landlord’s duty to maintain premises]; 
(3) organized or become a member of a tenant’s union or similar or-
ganization; [or] 
[(4) exercised [in good faith] a legal right or remedy under the lease 
or this [act]]; or  
[(5) pursued [in good faith] a legal action against the landlord or tes-
tified [in good faith] against  the landlord in court]. 
(b) A landlord may not [, within six months after the tenant’s conduct in subsec-
tion (a),] retaliate against the tenant by:  
(1) increasing or threatening to increase the rent; 
(2) decreasing services, increasing the tenant’s obligations, or oth-
erwise substantially altering the  terms of the lease;  
(3) bringing or threatening to bring an action for possession;  
(4) terminating or refusing to renew the lease; or 
(5) engaging in or threatening to engage in conduct prohibited under 
[the criminal code].  
April 2013 RURLTA Draft, supra note 1, § 901(a)–(b) (alterations in original except “[land-
lord’s duty to maintain premises]”). 
 17. Compare UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 5.101(c), with April 2013 
RURLTA Draft, supra note 1, § 901(c). 
 18. URLTA is limited to residential tenancies and, thus, this Article will only address 
evictions from residential premises. This Article will not discuss eviction issues directly 
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These issues are of critical importance. As NCCUSL noted when 
URLTA was first adopted, “a man’s home usually ranks second only to his 
family.”19 Yet, “[e]viction is perhaps the most understudied process affect-
ing the lives of the urban poor.”20 An eviction may cause undue harm and 
hardship to a tenant—financially, psychologically, and socially. Evictions 
may affect any sector of society and, in fact, impact a large sector of the 
U.S. population, particularly women and minorities. 
Eviction is an action by which the landlord compels the tenant to va-
cate the leased premises.21 Historically, tenants could be evicted when their 
actions put them “at-fault.” Grounds for “at-fault” eviction (i.e., evictions 
for cause) include a tenant’s failure to pay rent, a tenant’s holding over after 
termination of the lease, a tenant’s material noncompliance with the lease 
agreement, and a tenant’s failure to maintain the premises materially affect-
ing health and safety.22 
Recently, some landlords have been evicting tenants for no fault of 
their own.23 Some states have been so concerned about these actions on the 
part of landlords that they have included legislation attempting to block the 
landlords from terminating leases for reasons outside of the tenants’ con-
trol.24 This Article focuses on three reasons for attempted “no-fault” evic-
  
related to tenants residing in federal and state subsidized housing, such as evictions from 
Section 8 housing for criminal activity of persons other than the tenant. 
 19. Act Summary, supra note 2, art.1. 
 20. Matthew Desmond, Eviction and the Reproduction of Urban Poverty, 118 AM. J. 
SOC. 88, 90 (2012). 
 21. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (9th ed. 2009). Eviction may be actual or con-
structive. Actual eviction is the “physical expulsion of a person from land or rental property.” 
Id. Constructive eviction is “a landlord's act of making premises unfit for occupancy, often 
with the result that the tenant is compelled to leave.” Id. For a further discussion of construc-
tive eviction, see Donald E. Campbell, Forty (Plus) Years After the Revolution: Observation 
on the Implied Waranty of Habitability, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); 
Douglas Smith, Speaker at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bowen Law 
Review Symposium: The Real Impact (Or Lack of) the Implied Warranty of Habitability 
(Feb. 1, 2013). 
 22. URLTA recognized these as bases for a landlord to terminate the lease and seek 
repossession. See UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT §§ 4.201, .301. 
 23. See Memorandum from Alice Noble-Allgire, Reporter, Joint Editorial Bd. for Unif. 
Real Prop. Acts, to Unif. Law Comm’n URLTA Drafting Comm., on Early Lease Termina-
tion for Domestic Violence and Other Reasons,  3 (Feb. 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/residential%20landlord%20and%20tenant/urlta_me
mo_earlyleasetermination_021212.pdf [hereinafter Domestic Violence Memorandum] (citing 
Elizabeth M. Whitehorn, Unlawful Evictions of Female Victims of Domestic Violence: Ex-
tending Title VII’s Sex Stereotyping Theories to the Fair Housing Act, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 
1419 (2007)). 
 24. For example, North Carolina has a statute that provides that a “landlord shall not 
terminate a tenancy, . . . based substantially on: (i) the tenant, applicant, or a household 
member's status as a victim of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking.” N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 42-42.2 (2013); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-402(1) (2013); WASH. REV. CODE 
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tions: foreclosure of the premises, proposed sale of the premises, or intended 
re-occupancy by the landlord. There are various other reasons why a tenant 
may be evicted for no fault of her own. For example, a landlord may attempt 
to terminate a lease and evict the tenant simply because she is a victim of 
domestic violence.25 Or, a lease may be terminated where the premises have 
been condemned due to the landlord’s failure to maintain the premises.26 
These types of “no-fault” evictions raise critical public policy concerns, but 
  
§ 59.18.580(1) (2013). On the other hand, some jurisdictions have passed troubling nuisance 
ordinances that seem to encourage or basically force landlords to evict tenants who are vic-
tims of domestic violence. See generally Matthew Desmond & Nicol Valdez, Unpolicing the 
Urban Poor: Consequences of Third-Party Policing for Inner-City Women, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 
117 (2013); see also Briggs v. Borough of Norristown, No. 2:13-cv-02191 (E.D. Pa. filed 
Apr. 24, 2013). 
 25. See Domestic Violence Memorandum, supra note 23, at 9.  
 26. Condemnation of the leased premises may occur either because the property is found 
to be unsuitable for habitation or the government takes the property through eminent domain. 
The latter is less troubling because, under the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the 
tenants should receive compensation for his loss. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV; Alamo 
Land & Cattle Co., Inc. v. United States, 424 U.S. 295, 303 (1976). As to the former, a gov-
ernmental entity that deems a structure unsafe or unfit for habitation will generally require the 
residents to vacate the premises. A landlord’s failure to maintain a building may thus lead to 
a tenant’s eviction from that property. Unscrupulous landlords have permitted buildings to 
purposefully deteriorate or otherwise become uninhabitable, leading to condemnation of 
buildings in order to circumvent their obligations, rid themselves of tenants, and potentially 
sell the land for profit. A 2003 study of evictions noted: 
The gentrification process sometimes finds private market forces working in tan-
dem with government agencies to produce evictions: In New York City’s China-
town, for example, close to trendy areas like SoHo and TriBeCa, landlords have 
been calling in fire and building code inspectors to evict tenants in partitioned 
spaces – “remodeling” overlooked (and even created) by landlords for years until 
the bondtraders with deep pockets came looking for hip quarters and in the pro-
cess producing rents four times the level of rent-controlled and rent-stabilized 
units. 
Chester Hartman & David Robinson, Evictions: The Hidden Housing Problem, 14 HOUSING 
POLICY DEBATE 461, 466 (2003) (citing Yilu Zhao, Chinatown Gentrifies, and Evicts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 23, 2002, at A13). 
  In his recently published article, Matthew Desmond, Assistant Professor of Sociolo-
gy and Social Studies, related the following regarding condemned leasehold property: “I met 
landlords who purposely rendered their property condemnable (e.g., by cutting off the elec-
tricity) before placing an anonymous call to the city about their own property—a call that, in 
turn, resulted in officials removing the tenants, thereby providing the landlord with a free and 
expedited eviction.” Desmond, supra note 20, at 109 n. 13. My colleagues on the Symposium 
panel, Professor Donald Campbell and Douglas Smith, Esq., have done an excellent job of 
addressing issues related to the deteriorating physical condition of leased premises in their 
individual discussions of the warranty of habitability. See supra note 21. 
For a discussion of issues related to dispossession of tenants when property is condemned 
due to an act of God, see Eloisa C. Rodriguez-Dod & Olympia Duhart, Evaluating Katrina: A 
Snapshot of Renters’ Rights Following Disasters, 31 NOVA L. REV. 467 (2007). 
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they are not addressed in this Article because fellow panelists effectively 
addressed them at the Symposium.27 
It is helpful to recall traditional landlord tenant law and its evolution in 
respect to evictions in order to better understand the current state of “no-
fault” eviction laws generally. Accordingly, Part II of this Article provides 
an overview of the history of landlord tenant law and its relevance to evic-
tions. Part III includes statistics regarding evictions. It also provides statis-
tics on those who are affected by a landlord’s early termination of a lease. 
Part IV analyzes the common law, statutes, or uniform acts regarding “no-
fault” evictions of tenants from private residential dwellings in cases of 
foreclosure, sales, and landlord’s intended re-occupancy. Lastly, the final 
part intertwines policy issues and proposes recommendations for RURLTA. 
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF LANDLORD TENANT LAW AND 
EVICTIONS 
The evolution of landlord tenant law progressed from status to property 
to contract and has been continuously plagued by tensions resulting from the 
simultaneous operation of property law and contract principles.28 The status 
phase of landlord tenant law began in the period immediately following the 
Norman Conquest and lasted roughly until the fifteenth century.29 At this 
early stage, villein tenants (feudal tenants) simply “held at the will of the 
lord with no right to alienate and with no right to pass the land on to his 
heirs.”30 The concept of a tenancy at will survived beyond the status phase 
into the property stage of the evolution. At common law, it was defined as a 
tenancy in which the tenant holds possession with the landlord's consent, but 
  
 27. See Campbell, supra note 21; Lawrence R. McDonough, Then and Now: The Uni-
form Residential Landlord and Tenant Act and the Revised Residential Landlord and Tenant 
Act—Still Bold and Relevant, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); Smith, 
supra note 21. 
 28. Hiram H. Lesar, The Landlord-Tenant Relation in Perspective: From Status to Con-
tract and Back in 900 Years? 9 U. KAN. L. REV. 369, 377 (1960); see also Medico-Dental 
Bldg. Co. of Los Angeles v. Horton & Converse, 132 P.2d 457, 462 (Cal. 1942) (quoting 
Samuels v. Ottinger, 146 P. 638, 638–639 (Cal. 1915) (“While it is true that a lease is primar-
ily a conveyance in that it transfers an estate to the lessee, it also presents the aspect of a 
contract (citation omitted). This dual character serves to create two distinct sets of rights and 
obligations—“one comprising those growing out of the relation of landlord and tenant, and 
said to be based on the ‘privity of estate,’ and the other comprising those growing out of the 
express stipulations of the lease, and so said to be based on ‘privity of contract’” (citation 
omitted). Those features of the lease which are strictly contractual in their nature should be 
construed according to the rules for the interpretation of contracts generally and in conformi-
ty with the fundamental principle that the intentions of the parties should be given effect as 
far as possible.”). 
 29. Lesar, supra note 28, at 369. 
 30. Id. 
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without fixed terms.31 During this phase, either party was allowed to termi-
nate the lease at any time without notice.32 
By the latter half of the eighteenth century, however, courts developed 
a presumption against tenancies at will.33 This tendency was motivated by 
the courts’ concern with the hardship that could be caused by sudden termi-
nation and dispossession of a tenant where it was not clear that both parties 
(landlord and tenant) had agreed to such a fluid arrangement.34 Further, over 
the course of the nineteenth century, the rule that a lease for an indefinite 
period gave rise to a tenancy at will was practically swallowed up by excep-
tions.35 State statutes also mitigated the harshness of the at-will termination 
rule by imposing requirements of notice.36   
Additional protections for the tenant during the development of Ameri-
can landlord tenant law came in the form of limitations placed on a land-
lord’s ability to terminate a tenancy and evict a tenant. States enacted forci-
ble entry and detainer statutes37 to address the early American common 
law’s potential for violent conflict,38 which arose because landlords were 
allowed to engage in self-help, including forcible entry and expulsion of the 
tenant. 39 These statutes protected a tenant’s interest in maintaining posses-
sion while providing a landlord with an avenue to evict tenants.40 The em-
phasis placed on the security of tenure was also underscored by increasing 
  
 31. See Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 
B.C. L. REV. 503, 506 (1982). 
 32. Id. 
 33. This trend contributed to the birth of the concept of “periodic tenancy,” which was 
fully matured by the end of the nineteenth century. See id. at 507. Periodic tenancy is “tenan-
cy that automatically continues for successive periods—usu. month to month or year to 
year—unless terminated at the end of a period by notice.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 712 
(9th ed. 2009). 
 34. Glendon, supra note 31, at 507. 
 35. Id.  
 36. .Id.  
 37. Randy G. Gerchick, No Easy Way Out: Making The Summary Eviction Process A 
Fairer And More Efficient Alternative to Landlord Self-Help, 41 UCLA L. REV. 759, 776 
(1994). 
 38. See Act Summary, supra note 2 (“Most police departments list landlord-tenant prob-
lems as second only to ‘family matters’ as a case of violent incidents”); see also Sheriff's 
Deputy, Locksmith Killed During Eviction; Body Found in Burned Building, CNN (Apr. 13, 
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/13/justice/california-deputy-killed. 
 39. See Smith v. Reeder, 28 P. 890, 891 (Or. 1892) (“But, by the decided weight of 
authority, he [the landlord] may enter and expel the tenant by force, without being liable to an 
action of tort for damages, either for his entry upon the premises, or for an assault in expel-
ling the tenant, provided he uses no more force than is necessary and does no wanton dam-
age. His title and lawful right to the possession are a complete justification for his entry upon 
the land, and the tenant, as against him, has no right of occupation whatever.”); Gerchick, 
supra note 37, at 775–76 (1994). 
 40. Gerchick, supra note 37, at 778. 
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case law and legislation that made termination of the tenancy and eviction 
by the landlord increasingly difficult.41 For example, summary process stat-
utes often contained provisions for waiting periods or provisions granting 
the judge authority to grant a stay of the proceedings.42 In addition, a num-
ber of states enacted anti-retaliation statutes or imposed “good cause” or 
“good faith requirements” to limit a landlord’s ability to evict tenants.43 The-
se developments reflected the primacy of tenants’ interest in their homes and 
the public interest in rental units over landlords’ investments.44 
Another development during the evolution of landlord tenant law that 
has had significant impact on the equilibrium of landlord tenant relationship 
is the incorporation of contract principles. From very early on, courts began 
to criticize leases for their failure to apply enlightened principles of contract 
law and failure to adapt landlord tenant rules to the times.45 This dilemma, 
arguably, stemmed from the recognition that a lease is a conveyance of an 
interest in land as well as a bilateral contract.46 By the eighteenth century, 
the trend was for courts to apply contract principles to leases.47 
This push to change the basis of landlord tenant law from property law 
to contract law was central to the thinking of the drafters of URLTA.48 The 
drafters acknowledged that at the time URLTA was being developed Amer-
ican landlord tenant law, for the large part, was a product of the English 
common law, which developed in an agricultural society when contract doc-
trines were unrecognized.49 As a result, property law dominated; the parties’ 
covenants were deemed independent and “the landlord-tenant relationship 
was viewed as a conveyance of a lease-hold estate.”50 Echoing sentiments 
  
 41. Glendon, supra note 31, at 540–45. This development was at tension with the classi-
cal scheme, which recognized that the landlord had the right to possession of the lease prem-
ises upon termination of a lease term, a tenancy at will, or periodic tenancy and could refuse 
to renew the lease for any reason or no reason. Id. at 539–40. 
 42. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-10.6 (1957) (“[I]f it shall appear that by the issu-
ance of the warrant or writ the tenant will suffer hardship because of the unavailability of 
other dwelling accommodations the judge may stay the issuance of the warrant or writ and 
cause the same to issue at such time as he shall deem proper under the circumstances.”). See 
also Glendon, supra note 31, at 540. 
 43. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-9A-142 (2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-509 (2013); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.44 (2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 41, § 107 (2013).   
 44. Glendon, supra note 31, at 544 (citing Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F. 2d 
853 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). 
 45. Lesar, supra note 28, at 372. 
 46. Id. at 372–73. 
 47. Id. at 375. 
 48. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 1.102 cmt.; see also Glendon, supra 
note 31, at 503.   
 49. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 1.102 cmt. 
 50. Id. Cf. Glendon, supra note 31, at 505 (stating that “[t]he notion that American land-
lord-tenant law has evolved from property to contract ignores the long and variegated history 
of the leasehold estates. This history is that of a hybrid legal institution, neither entirely con-
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within the judiciary,51 URLTA’s drafters deemed the application of only 
property law principles as “inappropriate to modern urban conditions and 
inexpressive of the vital interests of the parties and the public which the law 
must protect.”52  Hence, URLTA sought to remove landlord tenant relations 
from the constraints of property law and incorporate contract principles, 
which tends to treat the performance of certain obligations of the parties as 
interdependent.53    
Today, a debate still exists as to whether American landlord tenant law 
is governed by contract principles or property law.54 If landlord tenant law 
were to be governed by contract principles, as the drafters of URLTA envi-
sioned, “no-fault” eviction statutes permitting a landlord to terminate a lease 
agreement prematurely would undermine this goal.55 Moreover, these “no-
fault” eviction statutes would subvert reasoned and balanced efforts to limit 
a landlord’s ability to evict a tenant only when the tenant has failed to com-
ply with the terms of his lease.56 Present data on the devastating impact of 
evictions dictate the need to curtail unwarranted evictions and promote the 
security of tenure. 
  
tractual nor entirely proprietary. The earliest leases of which we know in the common law 
systems were not considered real property. That rights under these leases were treated as 
more contractual than proprietary was only natural since the purpose of the early term of 
years typically had nothing to do with subsistence or shelter.”).  
 51. See Glendon, supra note 31, at 503 (stating that opinions of judges were instrumen-
tal to the shift from property to contract principles and the alterations in common law of 
landlord tenant law).  
 52. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 1.102 cmt. 
 53. See Legislative Fact Sheet, supra note 5. Cf. Glendon, supra note 31, at 504 (stating 
that “[l]ease law was never purely property law. By the turn of the century, and up to the 
1960s, it was an amalgam of real and personal property principles and of property and con-
tract notions.”). Applying contract law to interpret the parties’ covenants as interdependent 
has important practical consequences. For example, when landlord tenant law was dominated 
by property principles, and covenants were independent, even a material breach by the land-
lord would not relieve the tenant from paying rent, and the landlord could not retake posses-
sion where the tenant breached her rent covenant. The parties were limited to bringing a suit 
unless a statute or the agreement provided additional rights. By incorporating contract law 
and the doctrine of mutual dependence of promises in landlord tenant law, lease provisions in 
the nineteenth century provided for termination of the lease upon default of rent payments by 
the tenants.  Summary eviction statutes also arose that allowed the landlord to expeditiously 
remove holdover tenants or enforce rights against a tenant in default. Id. at 511–12. 
 54. See Tom G. Geurts, The Historical Development of the Lease in Residential Real 
Estate, 32 REAL EST. L.J. 356, 361 (2004). 
 55. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text. 
 56. See, e.g., supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. 
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III. EVICTION STATISTICS 
More Americans are choosing to rent57 because of the unstable job 
market,58 the overall wariness of the housing market,59 and the inability to 
obtain mortgages.60 Currently, more than one-third of the U.S. household 
population—over 40 million—is comprised of renters.61 From 2006 to 2011, 
the percentage of renters increased yearly,62 from 32.7% in 200663 to 35.4% 
in 201164. Consequently, more Americans have become subject to evictions. 
“Each year, an untold number of Americans are evicted or otherwise 
forced to leave their homes involuntarily.”65 Recent numbers regarding evic-
tions are as dire as older studies reflect. Yet, it has been difficult to gather 
and estimate eviction figures because no organization collects complete da-
ta.66  
Recognizing the dearth of evidence, and in an effort to bring light to 
the eviction plight, Chester Hartman, of the Poverty & Race Research Ac-
tion Council, and David Robinson, of Legal Services for New York City 
Legal Support Unit, published one of the most comprehensive studies collat-
  
 57. NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COAL., HOUSING SPOTLIGHT: RENTERS’ GROWING 
PAIN, 3 (Oct. 2011), available at nlihc.org/sites/default/files/HousingSpotlight1-1.pdf [here-
inafter RENTERS’ GROWING PAIN]; NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COAL., RENTERS IN 
FORECLOSURE: A FRESH LOOK AT AN ONGOING PROBLEM, 14 (Sept. 2012), available at 
nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Renters_in_Foreclosure_2012.pdf [hereinafter RENTERS IN 
FORECLOSURE]. 
 58. RENTERS’ GROWING PAIN, supra note 57, at 3. 
 59. Id. 
 60. RENTERS IN FORECLOSURE, supra note 57, at 14 (Identifying a “marked and poten-
tially long-term downshift in the supply of mortgage credit ” as a force behind declining 
home ownership) (quoting BEN BERNANKE, THE U.S. HOUSING MARKET: CURRENT CON-
DITIONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS (WHITE PAPER), FED. RESERVE SYS. (2012), available 
at http://federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/housing-white-paper-201 
20104.pdf).  
 61. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Physical Housing Characteristics for Occupied Housing 
Units: 2011 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates (2011) [hereinafter 2011 ACS], 
available at, http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml 
?pid=ACS_11_1YR_S2504&prodType=table (last visited Mar. 5, 2013) [hereinafter 2011 
ACS]. 
 62. See RENTERS’ GROWING PAIN, supra note 57 (analyzing data from the 2010 Ameri-
can Community Survey); 2011 ACS, supra note 61. 
 63. RENTERS’ GROWING PAIN, supra note 57. The number of renters increased by almost 
two percentage points between 2006 and 2010. See id. The figures for the four consecutive 
years are as follows: 32.8% in 2007; 33.4% in 2008; 34.1% in 2009; and 34.6% in 2010. Id. 
 64. 2011 ACS, supra note 61. 
 65. Hartman & Robinson, supra note 26, at 461. 
 66. Id.; Interview by Lynn Neary with Matthew Desmond, Sociologist, Univ. of Wis-
consin (Feb. 22, 2010), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId 
=123973493 (discussing the topic of black women being evicted at higher rates) [hereinafter 
NPR Interview]. 
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ing the “scattered available data” on evictions in 2003.67 Their study re-
vealed the following data. In the 1990s, five percent of all renters in Massa-
chusetts were evicted annually.68 New York City saw 1.26% of its renters 
evicted in 2000,69 and 1.2% of its renters—amounting to 23,647 renter 
households—evicted in 2001.70 Evictions in Cleveland amounted to 1.46% 
of renter households in 2000.71 In comparison, 5.81% of renter households 
were evicted in Baltimore that same year.72 One of the study’s reports esti-
mated that almost 10% of San Jose residents were evicted yearly.73 
A decade later, the numbers remain alarming. A study published in 
2012 found “eviction to be a frequent occurrence.”74 The author of this latest 
report, Professor Matthew Desmond, used Milwaukee (a city of approxi-
mately 600,000) as his study sample.75 His quantitative analysis concluded 
that sixteen evictions occurred daily,76 and, on average, an estimated 3.5% 
of Milwaukee’s tenants were evicted yearly.77 
Scholars have posited that these numbers are misleading, and that, in 
actuality, the numbers are much greater than what the data reflects.78 First, 
they argue that, when estimating evictions figures, one should take into ac-
count those tenants that ultimately leave the leased premises “voluntarily” 
because a landlord has threatened eviction79—the tenant leaves because the 
tenant does not have the time or resources to defend against the landlord’s 
threatened actions.80  
A simple notice of an unaffordable or undesired rent increase may trig-
ger a move; a letter from a landlord or managing agent regarding alleged 
violations of the lease or the law (pets, unauthorized additional tenants, 
behavioral infractions, etc.) may produce similar results; the landlord 
  
 67. Hartman & Robinson, supra note 26, at 461. 
 68. Id. at 471. The article notes that these evictions were due to the tenant’s failure to 
pay rent, and excluded other reasons for eviction. Id. 
 69. Id. at 473. 
 70. Id. at 471–72. 
 71. Id. at 473. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Hartman & Robinson, supra note 26, at 472. 
 74. Desmond, supra note 20, at 91. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 104. 
 77. Id. at 97. 
 78. Id. at 97–98 n. 8; see also Hartman & Robinson, supra note 26, at 462–67 (arguing 
that the eviction figures should include involuntary moves other than through a completed 
legal process).  
 79. Hartman & Robinson, supra note 26, at 463 (“Tenants move out when the legal 
process is preceded by a “termination of tenancy” notice from the landlord . . . .”). 
 80. Id. 
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may refuse to renew the lease; threatening letters from the property own-
er or from the lawyer representing the owner are often used . . . .81 
Second, some landlords move beyond threats and proceed with what 
may amount to illegal strong-arm or self-help tactics.82 For example, evic-
tion records will not reflect those instances where tenants vacated leased 
premises because landlords shut off utilities, removed possessions, or simply 
locked out the tenants.83 
Third, some landlords who desire to terminate leases dangle what may 
seem like golden carrots before impoverished tenants. Rather than pursuing 
an eviction proceeding in court, and to entice the tenants to vacate early, 
these landlords give the tenants cash for their keys.84 Professor Desmond 
reports that one apartment building manager he interviewed often paid ten-
ants $200 to vacate the premises rather than evicting them through judicial 
proceedings because paying tenants was less expensive than taking them to 
court.85 The building manager stated, “For every eviction I do that goes 
through the courts, there are at least 10 that don’t.”86 
Lastly, court records do not fully account for the magnitude of the 
number of persons being evicted from tenancies.87 Eviction records only 
reflect the names of the defendant tenants;88 as such, there is no method of 
calculating into the numbers other persons living with the tenants, such as 
family members or significant others, who are also forced to move from the 
premises along with the contracting tenant.89 
Any tenant may be subject to an eviction. However, studies reflect that 
the vast majority of those who are forced to vacate early are women, minori-
ties, and the poor.90 Garnering much attention, Professor Desmond’s recent 
  
 81. Id. 
 82. See Desmond, supra note 20, at 95. States have enacted statutes that preclude land-
lords from employing self-help tactics. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, § 14 (2013) 
(protecting occupants against utility shutoffs, interferences with utilities, non-consensual 
transfers of payment responsibilities for utilities, and against a lessor or landlord who “direct-
ly or indirectly” interferes with quiet enjoyment); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.67 (2013) (barring 
self-help). 
 83. Hartman & Robinson, supra note 26, at 463–64, 466–67; Desmond, supra note 20, 
at 95 (“Off-the-book evictions may account for a significant fraction of landlord-initiated 
moves.”). 
 84. Desmond, supra note 20, at 95. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.; see also Hartman & Robinson, supra note 26, at 472. 
 88. Desmond, supra note 20, at 95. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See, e.g., Hartman & Robinson, supra note 26, at 467. It is worth noting that renters 
earning less than $20,000 a year comprise one-third of the total population of renters. 
RENTERS’ GROWING PAIN, supra note 57, at 2. 
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research of evictions in Milwaukee91 found that those who were evicted 
were typically low-income black women.92 Almost half (46%) of Milwau-
kee’s court-ordered evictions took place in predominantly black neighbor-
hoods.93 In those neighborhoods, women were more than two times more 
likely than men to be evicted.94 Only 9.6% of the city’s population is made 
of black women; yet they accounted for 30% of those evicted.95 
These statistics are not the least bit surprising. The Hartman and Rob-
inson article revealed similar findings.96 Their reported studies of major cit-
ies, such as New York City, Chicago, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, 
and Oakland, showed that a disproportionate number of evictions take place 
in low-income minority households and mostly affect women.97 
In light of these statistics, there is no doubt that an urgent and compel-
ling need to address the issue of evictions exists. Clearly, some of these 
evictions are due to tenants’ failures to comply with the terms of their leas-
es. To the extent that some of these large numbers of evictions are not 
caused by the tenants’ actions, should they be permitted to occur? 
  
 91. See NPR Interview, supra note 66; New Research Shows High Risk of Eviction for 
Women in Predominantly Black Neighborhoods, NAT’L LOW I HOUSING COAL. (Sept. 21, 
2012), http://nlihc.org/article/new-research-shows-high-risk-eviction-women-predominantly-
black-neighborhoods [hereinafter High Risk of Eviction for Women]; Erick Eckholm, A Sight 
All Too Familiar in Poor Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/us/19evict.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 92. Desmond, supra note 20, at 91, 104. For a thorough discussion of the reasons why 
evictions may have burdened this population more than others, see id. at 105–18. 
 93. Id. at 98, 104. This number amounts to about one in fourteen renter households 
evicted yearly from black neighborhoods as compared to an approximate one in twenty-five 
evicted in Milwaukee overall. See id. at 97–98; see also High Risk of Eviction for Women, 
supra note 88. 
 94. Desmond, supra note 20, at 104. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Hartman & Robinson, supra note 26, at 467. 
 97. Id. Almost one-half of tenants facing eviction in New York City, 86% of which were 
African-American or Latino, had incomes less than $10,000. Id. The majority of tenants 
evicted in Baltimore were “poor black women.” Id. In Chicago, 72% were African-American 
and 62% were women. Id. Philadelphia experienced similar numbers—83% nonwhite and 
70% nonwhite women. Id. (citations omitted). 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF “NO-FAULT” EVICTIONS—FORECLOSURES, SALES, AND 
REPOSSESSIONS 
A. Foreclosure of Leased Premises 
Throughout America “tenants are being evicted from their homes soon 
after foreclosure of their landlords’ properties.”98 It is estimated that renter 
households account for at least 40% of the families displaced because of 
foreclosures—an estimate unchanged since 2009.99 Tenants who entered 
into lease agreements and dutifully paid their rent were nonetheless forced 
to vacate the leased premises after foreclosure.100 
Under the common law, claims regarding priority of interests in real 
property are governed under the principle of first in time, first in right.101 For 
example, a tenant may have entered into a lease agreement with a landlord 
who had given a mortgage to a lender before the date of the leasehold. Un-
beknownst to the tenant, he is not safe in presuming that he will be able to 
remain on the leased premises if a lender has priority. If the landlord de-
faults on the pre-existing mortgage, under the first in time, first in right prin-
ciple, the mortgage trumps the lease and a tenant can readily be evicted.102 
Thus, an innocent tenant would be dispossessed due to a landlord’s failure to 
pay his obligations.103 
Prior to 2009, most states permitted the purchaser of foreclosed proper-
ty to terminate an existing lease and evict the tenant.104 This practice was 
  
 98. Eloisa C. Rodriguez-Dod, Stop Shutting the Door on Renters: Protecting Tenants 
from Foreclosure Evictions, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 243, 247 (2010) [hereinafter Stop 
Shutting the Door on Renters].  
 99. RENTERS IN FORECLOSURE, supra note 57, at 1, 3. The report noted that the actual 
number of renters who were impacted by foreclosures tripled between 2008 and 2011. Id. at 
3. 
 100. Stop Shutting the Door on Renters, supra note 98, at 245. 
 101. United States v. City of New Britain, Connecticut, 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954). As be-
tween a mortgage and a lease on the premises, generally the mortgage is first in time to a 
residential lease. Id. 
 102. Tenants are generally not aware of this feature of the common law and, thus, do not 
understand the risks involved when entering into a lease with a landlord who has given a pre-
existing mortgage on the leased premises. Stop Shutting the Door on Renters, supra note 98, 
at 266. 
 103. Id. at 246. See also NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COAL., RENTERS IN FORECLOSURE 
FACT SHEET, 1 (Jan. 2013), available at nlihc.org/sites/default/files/RIF_FS.pdf [hereinafter 
FACT SHEET]. 
 104. Stop Shutting the Door on Renters, supra note 98, at 255 n.88. In some states, a 
foreclosed leasehold is converted into a tenancy at sufferance, a month-to-month tenancy, or 
a tenancy at will. Id. In others, such as Florida, the lease is terminated upon the successful 
foreclosure if the lender joins the tenant as a plaintiff in the foreclosure action. Id. at 260. A 
few states do not permit foreclosure of a mortgage as a basis for eviction. Id. at 263; see also 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186A, § 2 (2013).  
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temporarily curtailed by the enactment of the Protecting Tenants at Foreclo-
sure Act of 2009 (PTFA).105 The PTFA requires a purchaser at foreclosure to 
provide ninety days’ notice to bona fide tenants before forcing them to va-
cate the premises.106 Furthermore, the PTFA provides the bona fide lessee 
the right to remain on the leased premises until expiration of the existing 
lease term.107 Notwithstanding the latter, a purchaser at foreclosure who 
plans to occupy the property as her primary residence can terminate that 
right by giving the aforementioned ninety-day notice.108  
Although the PTFA purportedly affords protections to a tenant caught 
up in the foreclosure web, it has failed to do so in some major respects.109 
First, the PTFA will sunset on December 31, 2014.110 Thus, the PTFA pro-
tections will no longer be in a tenant’s horizon after that date. Tenants will 
have to revert to whatever state law is in effect at the time of foreclosure. 
Minnesota Democratic Representative Keith Ellison has twice introduced 
bills in Congress to extend the PTFA indefinitely; however, in 2011 and 
2012, Congress failed to act on the proposed legislation, and the bills died 
each time.111 It is expected that Representative Ellison will again reintroduce 
the Permanently Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act before the PTFA 
  
 105. Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, §§ 701–704, 123 
Stat. 1632, 1661 (2009) [hereinafter PTFA]. 
 106. Id. § 702(a)(1). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
clarified that all leases entered into prior to transfer of title of the leased premises to the pur-
chaser at foreclosure are covered under the PTFA. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1484, 124 Stat. 1376, 2204 (2010) [hereinafter 
Dodd-Frank Act]. 
 107. PTFA § 702(a)(2)(A).  
[A] lease or tenancy shall be considered bona fide only if— 
(1) the mortgagor or the child, spouse, or parent of the mortgagor 
under the contract is not the tenant; 
(2) the lease or tenancy was the result of an arms-length transaction; 
and 
(3) the lease or tenancy requires the receipt of rent that is not sub-
stantially less than fair market rent for the property or the unit's rent 
is reduced or subsidized due to a Federal, State, or local subsidy. 
Id. § 702(b). 
 108. Id. § 702(a)(1). 
 109. See infra notes 109–131 and accompanying text. There has also been criticism of the 
PTFA as effectuating an unconstitutional taking. See Tony S. Guo, Tenants at Foreclosure: 
Mitigating Harm to Innocent Victims of the Foreclosure Crisis, 4 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. 
JUSTICE 215, 231-32 (2011); Ngai Pindell, Home Sweet Home? The Efficacy Of Rental Re-
strictions To Promote Neighborhood Stability, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 41, 78 (2009). 
 110. PTFA, supra note 105, at § 704. Its initial expiration was set for December 31, 2012, 
but was later extended. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 106. 
 111. Permanently Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2010, H.R. 4766 111th Cong. 
(2010); Permanently Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2011, H.R. 3619 112th Cong. 
(2011). 
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expires at the end of this Congressional session.112 Even if it is permanently 
enacted, the Permanently Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act would con-
tinue to allow termination of the lease with ninety-days’ notice where the 
purchaser plans to occupy.113 
Another point of contention with the PTFA is its failure to provide spe-
cifically for its enforcement. Reports have cited instances where purchasers 
at foreclosure—particularly lending institutions that have taken possession 
at foreclosure—have undermined tenants’ rights under the PTFA.114 Unfor-
tunately, the PTFA does not provide for any institutional oversight. Alt-
hough the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation stated that it would 
“monitor and enforce compliance with the requirements of [the PTFA],”115 
efforts, if any, seem to have failed.116 The PTFA also failed to include an 
express private right of action. 
The case of Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company is a 
prime example of the PTFA’s shortcomings.117 There, Deutsche Bank fore-
closed on property leased by two renters, Rosario Nativi and Jose Perez.118 
Nativi and Perez then informed Deutsche Bank’s agent that they had a one-
year lease on the property;119 the tenants heard nothing from Deutsche Bank 
or its agent.120 Shortly afterwards, while Nativi and Perez were out of town, 
their belongings were tossed out.121 When Perez returned, the police were 
called to bar him from entering the premises.122 At the time, Nativi and Pe-
  
 112. FACT SHEET, supra note 103. 
 113. See, e.g., H.R. 4766 & H.R. 3619, supra note 111. 
 114. See, e.g., Without Justification: Banks Continue Mass Displacement of Innocent 
Tenants after Foreclosure (Tenants Together, Cal.) Nov. 2010, at 7. 
 115. Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act: Public Law, (FDIC) Sept. 28, 2009, availa-
ble at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2009/fil09056.html; see also RENTERS IN 
FORECLOSURE, supra note 57, at 11. 
 116. See RENTERS IN FORECLOSURE, supra note 57, at 12. The report states: 
To fill the role that typically is attributed to a regulator or overseeing entity, nonprofit organi-
zations, including the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty (NLCHP), the 
National Housing Law Project and NLIHC often work with lending institutions and the gov-
ernment sponsored enterprises to ensure that notices and other documents are complaint [sic] 
with the PTFA. Id. 
 117. Nativi v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., No. 09-06096, 2010 WL 2179885 (N.D. 
Cal. May 26, 2010). 
 118. Id. at *1. 
 119. Id. The court opinion confirms that the tenants’ most current lease at the time the 
complaint was filed commenced June 1, 2009, and was to terminate June 1, 2010. Id. The 
tenants, in fact, had been renting the property since June 2007. See NLIHC Joins Amicus 
Brief Supporting Tenants Evicted in Violation of PTFA, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COAL. 
(Nov. 16, 2012), http://nlihc.org/article/nlihc-joins-amicus-brief-supporting-tenants-evicted-
violation-ptfa [hereinafter NLIHC Joins Amicus Brief]. 
 120. Nativi, 2010 WL 2179885, at *1. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
856 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
rez still had ten months remaining on their lease.123 Deutsche Bank ignored 
the PTFA and refused to allow the tenants to return to the property for the 
remaining term of their lease.124 The tenants sued Deutsche Bank in state 
court, alleging, among other counts, violation of their rights under the 
PTFA.125 Deutsche Bank promptly removed the case to federal court on the 
basis of federal question jurisdiction.126 
In a case of first impression, the U.S. District Court dismissed the ten-
ants’ claim under the PTFA, holding that the PTFA does not provide for a 
private right of action, and transferred the case back to the Superior Court of 
California.127 The tenants eventually appealed to the California Court of 
Appeal,128 and amicus curiae briefs were filed for both sides.129 One of the 
questions raised is whether the PTFA creates an ongoing, landlord-tenant 
relationship for the duration of a lease or merely provides a limited right to 
continued occupancy and possession of the premises.130 If the landlord-
tenant relationship continues, then the rights of a tenant regarding his occu-
pancy would apply, including the right to sue for violations of the lease on 
the part of the landlord. As of the date of publication of this Article, resolu-
tion of Nativi was pending.131  
After enactment of the PTFA, and in response to the ongoing foreclo-
sure crisis, several states enacted legislation providing similar protections to 
those found in the PTFA. For example, Maryland enacted legislation permit-
ting tenants to remain on foreclosed property for the remaining term of the 
lease, unless the purchaser at foreclosure intends to occupy the property as 
  
 123. Id. 
 124. NLIHC Joins Amicus Brief, supra note 119. 
 125. Nativi, 2010 WL 2179885, at *1. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at *2, *4–5. 
 128. Nativi v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., No. H037715(Cal. Ct. App. filed Dec. 13, 
2011). 
 129. Brief of Nat'l Hous. Law Project et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants, 
Nativi v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., No. H037715 (Cal. Ct. App. filed Dec. 13, 2011) 
available at http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Nativi_Amicus_Brief.pdf; Brief of Am. Legal 
and Fin. Network as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Nativi v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l 
Trust Co., No. H037715 (Cal. Ct. App. filed Dec. 13, 2011). 
 130. See Brief of Am. Legal and Fin. Network as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respond-
ents at 13, 18, Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, No. H037715 (Cal. Ct. 
App. filed Dec. 13, 2011). 
 131. However, since the Nativi lawsuit was filed, state courts have recognized a private 
cause of action under the PTFA. See, Curtis v. US Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 50 A.3d 558 (Md. 
2012); Fontaine v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 372 S.W.3d 257 (Tex. App. 2012). By 
contrast, other U.S. District Courts have held that no private right of action exists under the 
PTFA. See, e.g., Grayham v. Fannie Mae Corp., No. Civ. 11-6194-HO, 2012 WL 89838 (D. 
Or. Jan. 9, 2012); Ingo v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., No. 2:11-cv-812 BCW, 2011 WL 
5983340 (D. Utah Nov. 29, 2011). 
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his primary residence.132 Massachusetts, likewise, allows for survival of the 
tenancy after foreclosure.133 However, Massachusetts provides a lesser de-
gree of protection as it permits eviction where the foreclosing owner has 
contracted for the sale of the property to a third party, with no requirement 
that the purchaser intends to occupy the premises.134  
Most recently, in 2012, California enacted legislation protecting tenants 
when the lease property is foreclosed.135 In the case of a fixed-term lease, the 
statute provides that the tenant “shall have the right to possession until the 
end of the lease term,”136 unless the purchaser at foreclosure intends to oc-
cupy the premises as his primary residence.137 Further, California’s statute 
expressly provides that “all rights and obligations under the lease shall sur-
vive foreclosure.”138 Thus, in California, a tenant’s lease—not just his right 
to occupy—survives foreclosure and the tenant’s legal claims under the 
lease similarly survive.139 The PTFA does not expressly include a provision 
stating that the lease itself survives foreclosure—one of the questions as yet 
unresolved in Nativi. 
Although termination of a lease after foreclosure is not inconsistent 
with property and contract law principles, Congress and the states that have 
enacted similar protections as the PTFA did so for public policy reasons. 
Social policy justifications include minimizing disruption for tenants who 
are innocent victims of foreclosure and simply caught in the crossfire.140 As 
poignantly described by Sen. John Kerry during the passage of PTFA: “A 
landlord should not be allowed to come in . . . and force out tenants who 
were there completely legitimately, with an expectation that they were com-
ing home to their same old home.”141 
Should the Committee include provisions in RURLTA to protect ten-
ants in foreclosed properties? If so, should RURLTA expressly provide lan-
guage to the effect that all the rights under the lease survive foreclosure? 
Should it also expressly provide that a tenant aggrieved by a violation of the 
protective measures in the statute has a right to bring a civil action? Should 
such an express right of action also expressly provide that the tenant bring-
ing such action has a right to obtain any appropriate equitable or declaratory 
  
 132. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105.6 (LexisNexis 2008). 
 133. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186A, § 2 (2008). 
 134. Id. 
 135. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1161b (West 2013). This statute will sunset on December 31, 
2019. Id. § 1161b(f). 
 136. Id. § 1161b(b). 
 137. Id. § 1161b(b)(1). 
 138. Id. § 1161b(b). 
 139. See id. 
 140. See Stop Shutting the Door on Renters, supra note 98, at 246, 248, 250. 
 141. 155 CONG. REC. S5111 (daily ed. May 5, 2009) (statement of Sen. Kerry in discuss-
ing the PTFA). 
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relief and recover appropriate monetary damages, costs, and reasonable at-
torneys’ fees? 
B. Sale of Rental Property 
Under property and contract law principles, foreclosure terminates an 
existing lease because of a lender’s priority in interest.142 By contrast, under 
property and contract law principles, a landlord’s sale of the leased premises 
to a third party does not automatically terminate an existing lease, absent an 
express provision in the contract.143 The new owner will take possession 
subject to the lease that was in place until, or unless, both the new owner 
and the tenant agree to changes.  
However, in its September 2012 draft of RURLTA, the Committee in-
cluded a provision—section 701(d)(1)—that would permit a landlord to 
terminate a tenancy if the landlord “accepted an offer to purchase the dwell-
ing unit from an individual who intends in good faith to occupy the dwelling 
unit as the individual’s primary residence.”144 That provision was included 
in Article Seven titled “Termination of Periodic Tenancy, Death of a Tenant, 
Holdover Tenancy, Abuse of Access.”145 Both the January 2013 and April 
2013 drafts of RURLTA excluded this provision.146 It is unclear whether the 
Committee intends to resuscitate this provision in a separate section on evic-
tions,147 include this provision in the section on retaliatory conduct by the 
landlord, or omit the provision altogether. 
Allowing a landlord to terminate a lease because he wants to sell the 
premises may be based on state laws that deem such actions as defenses to 
claims of retaliatory evictions. For example, in Hawaii and Delaware, a 
landlord may recover possession of the leased premises where he has en-
tered into a contract in “good faith” for the sale of the leased premises.148 In 
  
 142. For public policy reasons, the PTFA and states override those principles by provid-
ing tenants some relief. See PTFA § 702. 
 143. Kirk Corp. v. First American Title Co., 270 Cal. Rptr. 24, 38 (Ct. App. 1990). 
 144. September 2012 RURLTA Draft, supra note 1, § 701(d)(1). 
 145. Id. art. 7. 
 146. See January 2013 RURLTA Draft, supra note 1; April 2013 RURLTA Draft, supra 
note 1. 
 147. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 148. HAW. REV. STAT. § 521-74(b)(6) (2013) (stating that a landlord may rebut the pre-
sumption of retaliation and “may recover possession of the dwelling unit if … [t]he landlord 
has in good faith contracted to sell the property, and the contract of sale contains a represen-
tation by the purchaser [that the purchaser desires to occupy the property or alter, remodel, or 
demolish the unit]”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5516(d)(7) (2009) (stating that landlord has a 
defense to a claim of retaliation where the “landlord has in good faith contracted to sell the 
property, and the contract of sale contains a representation by the purchaser [that the purchas-
er desires to occupy the property or alter, remodel, or demolish the unit or remove the unit 
from the rental market].”). 
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each of those states’ provisions, the contract must contain a representation 
by the purchaser regarding her intent to move into the premises.149 These 
provisions differ from those provided for in the District of Colombia, which 
grants tenants the right of first refusal before the landlord can sell to a third 
party.150 
The District of Colombia specifically permits a landlord to repossess 
leased premises where he has a written contract for the sale of the property 
and the new owner desires to immediately occupy the unit.151 There are a 
number of protections that the District of Columbia has put in place in this 
scenario. For instance, the landlord must give the tenant ninety days’ notice 
prior to an action to repossess the property, and must proceed in good 
faith.152 Most importantly, the tenant has a right of first refusal.153 Before the 
landlord can sell the property, the tenant must be notified in writing of her 
right and opportunity to purchase the rental unit.154 Indeed, this right is spe-
cifically provided for in the Tenants’ Opportunity to Purchase Act 
(“TOPA”).155 
TOPA not only gives tenants a right of first refusal, but it also entitles 
them to assign their rights to a third party.156 If the rental unit is a single-
family home, the tenant must notify the landlord of her interest in purchas-
ing the property within thirty days of the landlord’s offer.157 If the tenant 
expresses her interest in writing, the landlord must allow an additional sixty 
days for negotiation of the contract.158 For every day the owner of the unit 
delays, a day is added.159 The tenant must also be given at least sixty days to 
arrange financing.160 For accommodations of two to four units, TOPA also 
delineates the amount of time that tenants must be given.161 And if the build-
ing has five or more units, in order to make a contract of sale with the own-
er, the tenants must form a tenant organization, the characteristics of which 
are outlined in the statute.162 
  
 149. HAW. REV. STAT. § 521-74(b)(6) (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5516(d)(7) 
(2012). 
 150. See Tenants’ Opportunity to Purchase Act, D.C. CODE § 42-3404.02(a) (2013) [here-
inafter TOPA]. 
 151. D.C. CODE § 42-3505.01(e) (2001). 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. TOPA § 42-3404.02(a). 
 156. Id. §§ 42-3404.02(a), 3404.06. 
 157. Id. § 42-3404.09(1). 
 158. Id. § 42-3404.09(2). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. § 42-3404.09(3). 
 161. TOPA § 42-3404.10. 
 162. Id. § 42-3404.11. 
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If RURLTA includes a provision allowing a landlord to repossess 
leased premises simply by entering into a contract for sale, would the land-
lord, in effect, be converting a tenancy for a fixed term to a tenancy at will? 
Clearly this should not be allowed. If a landlord wants the option of prema-
turely terminating a lease upon sale of the property, the landlord could con-
ceivably negotiate and include a provision in the lease to that effect. What if, 
however, rather than prematurely terminating the lease, a landlord instead 
simply decides not to renew the lease because he wants to sell? There is no 
question a landlord would be allowed to do so unless he is using this as a 
subterfuge against the prohibition on retaliatory evictions.163 
C. Re-occupancy by Landlord 
Retaliatory eviction refers to a certain conduct by a landlord that has 
the effect of forcing a tenant to vacate the premises at the end of the lease 
term, commonly in month-to-month leases. For example, a landlord may 
raise the monthly rent, reduce services, or refuse to renew a lease.164 A land-
lord is prohibited from taking such action if the motive is in retaliation for a 
tenant asserting certain legal rights, such as complaining to housing authori-
ties regarding code violations. 
Retaliatory eviction gained recognition in the seminal case of Edwards 
v. Habib.165 In that case, a month-to-month tenant had reported “to the De-
partment of Licenses and Inspections of sanitary code violations which her 
landlord had failed to remedy.”166 Thereafter, the landlord served the tenant 
with the requisite thirty-day notice of termination (or nonrenewal) of the 
lease.167 Upon the tenant’s failure to surrender the premises, the landlord 
obtained a judgment for possession.168 The tenant then successfully moved, 
in a hearing, to set the judgment aside on the basis that the landlord’s “no-
tice to quit was given in retaliation for her complaints to the housing au-
thorities.”169 However, at trial, another judge held that evidence of a retalia-
  
 163. See, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
 164. The term retaliatory eviction is actually a confusing misnomer. The landlord’s con-
duct, itself, is what is retaliatory. An eviction is only necessitated, for example, if the tenant 
does not pay the increased rent or refuses to surrender the premises upon nonrenewal of the 
lease. However, because a landlord’s retaliatory conduct so often leads to evictions, the retal-
iatory actions themselves are basically deemed to be in the nature of an eviction. A tenant 
may use retaliatory eviction as a defense against eviction or as grounds for a cause of action 
against a landlord before the landlord institutes any eviction proceeding. 
 165. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
 166. Id. at 688. 
 167. Id. at 689. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
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tory motive was “irrelevant” to a landlord’s action to possession of leased 
premises.170 On appeal, the court stated that: 
[I]n making his affirmative case for possession [a] landlord need only 
show that his tenant has been given the 30-day statutory notice, and he 
need not assign any reason for evicting a tenant who does not occupy the 
premises under a lease. But while the landlord may evict for any legal 
reason or for no reason at all, he is not, we hold, free to evict in retalia-
tion for his tenant’s report of housing code violations to the authorities. 
As a matter of statutory construction and for reasons of public policy, 
such an eviction cannot be permitted.171 
The court was addressing the landlord’s retaliatory conduct (nonrenewal of 
the lease), which consequently led to the tenant’s eviction when the tenant 
refused to vacate the premises.172 
When URLTA was promulgated a few years later, NCCUSL included 
a section on retaliatory conduct.173 With certain exceptions, URLTA § 5.101 
prohibited retaliatory evictions as follows: 
(a) [A] landlord may not retaliate by increasing rent or decreasing ser-
vices or by bringing or threatening to bring an action for possession af-
ter: 
(1) the tenant has complained to a governmental agency 
charged with responsibility for enforcement of a building or 
housing code of a violation applicable to the premises materi-
ally affecting health and safety; or 
(2) the tenant has complained to the landlord of a violation 
under Section 2.104 [landlord’s duty to maintain premises]; 
or 
(3) the tenant has organized or become a member of a tenant's 
union or similar organization.174 
  
 170. Id. 
 171. Edwards, 397 F.2d at 699 (emphasis added). 
 172. Courts and legislatures that thereafter adopted retaliatory eviction as a defense to a 
landlord’s action for possession additionally viewed other conduct on the part of the landlord 
as retaliatory. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, § 18 (1969) (landlord increases rent or 
substantially alters terms of tenancy with retaliatory motives); Aweeka v. Bonds, 97 Cal. 
Rptr. 650 (1971) (where landlord raised rent to amount landlord knew tenant could not afford 
after month-to-month tenant complained about needed repairs). 
 173. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 5.101. In doing so, NCCUSL cited 
to several states that had recognized the defense of retaliatory eviction in case law and stat-
utes. Id. § 5.101 cmt. 
 174. Id. § 5.101(a). 
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Nevertheless, a landlord was permitted to bring a cause of action for posses-
sion of the premises if: 
(1) the violation of the applicable building or housing code was caused 
primarily by lack of reasonable care by the tenant, a member of his fami-
ly, or other person on the premises with his consent; or 
(2) the tenant is in default in rent; or 
(3) compliance with the applicable building or housing code requires al-
teration, remodeling, or demolition which would effectively deprive the 
tenant of use of the dwelling unit.175 
In its recent revision of URLTA, the Drafting Committee has added several 
additional grounds upon which a landlord may retake possession notwith-
standing the prohibition on retaliatory evictions, two of which are unrelated 
to a tenant’s conduct:176  
 (8) the landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession of the unit for 
immediate use as the primary residence of the landlord or the landlord’s 
parent, spouse, child, or sibling.177 
  
 175. Id. § 5.101(c). 
 176. The other proposed grounds are: 
(2) the tenant’s conduct under subsection (a) was made in an unreasonable man-
ner, at an unreasonable time, or was repeated in a manner having the effect of 
harassing the landlord; 
. . . . 
(4) the tenant, an immediate family member, or other person on the premises 
with the tenant’s consent, other than the landlord or the landlord’s agent, en-
gaged in conduct that presents a threat to the health or safety of another tenant of 
the dwelling unit or another dwelling unit on the premises; 
(5) the tenant, an immediate family member, or other person on the premises 
with the tenant’s consent, other than the landlord or the landlord’s agent, used the 
premises or the unit for an illegal purpose;  
April 2013 RURLTA Draft, supra note 1, § 901(c)(2), (4)–(5). 
 177. Id. § 901(c). Subsection 901(c)(6) was added in the April 2013 draft of RURLTA. 
The January 2013 draft of the RURLTA did include a provision permitting a landlord to 
recover the leased premises where “the landlord seeks in good faith . . . [to] use [the premis-
es] as the landlord’s primary residence.” January 2013 RURLTA Draft, supra note 1, § 
802(b)(6). The April 2013 draft of RURLTA expanded the proposed provision to permit 
repossession of the dwelling unit for use as the primary residence of not only the landlord but 
also “the landlord’s parent, spouse, child, or sibling.” April 2013 RURLTA Draft, supra note 
1, § 901(c)(8). In contrast to the provision that had been questionably added to the September 
2012 draft of RURLTA, permitting landlords to repossess the premises for sale to a third 
party, see supra notes144–151 and accompanying text, the proposed provision permitting 
recovery for the landlord’s own use was included where it should be—if at all—in the section 
regarding retaliatory evictions. Id. 
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Jurisdictions that permit a landlord to repossess the leased property for 
his own use and occupancy often attach a specific good faith requirement to 
the exercise of this right. Connecticut, for example, specifically requires 
this.178 The Connecticut statute also includes a temporal requirement—the 
landlord must seek to repossess the unit for “immediate use as his own 
abode.”179 
In New York, the landlord must show good faith in addition to an 
“immediate and compelling necessity” to repossess the leased premises for 
his or his family’s occupancy and personal use.180 The New York statute 
specifically enumerates which family members fall within the purview of 
the statute.181 These include the landlord’s spouse, son, daughter, stepson, 
stepdaughter, father, mother, stepfather, stepmother, brother, sister, grandfa-
ther, grandmother, grandson, granddaughter, father-in-law, mother-in-law, 
son-in-law, or daughter-in-law.182 
The proposed language in the April 2013 draft of RURLTA does not 
include any specific good faith requirement. However, the draft does incor-
porate a generalized duty to act in good faith.183 
Even with a good faith requirement, permitting termination of a lease 
so that a landlord may move in would significantly circumvent the prohibi-
tion on retaliatory evictions. On balance, would the benefit of such a provi-
sion for landlords be outweighed by the potential of increased evictions? 
Should the landlord’s desire to move in trump the tenant’s right to rely on 
the validity and duration of his tenancy? 
  
 178. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-20a(a)(2) (West 2013). 
 179. Id. 
 180. N.Y. RENT & EVICT § 2104.5(a)(1) (McKinney 2013). 
 181. Id. § 2104.5(a)(1); accord., SANTA MONICA RENT CONTROL LAW, § 1806(a)(8) 
(2013) (“The landlord seeks to recover possession in good faith for use and occupancy by 
herself or himself, or her or his children, parents, grandparents, brother, sister, father-in-law, 
mother-in-law, son-in-law, or daughter-in-law . . . No eviction may take place if any landlord 
or enumerated relative already occupies one unit on the property, or if a vacancy already 
exists on the property and the vacant unit is comparable to the unit for which eviction is 
sought. Where the vacant unit is determined not to be comparable, thereby permitting evic-
tion under this Subsection, the evicted tenant or tenants shall be first given the right to occupy 
the vacant unit and the rent thereof shall be the lesser of the maximum allowable rent for the 
vacant unit and the maximum allowable rent of the unit from which the tenant or tenants are 
evicted … The landlord or enumerated relative must intend in good faith to move into the 
unit within thirty (30) days after the tenant vacates and to occupy the unit as a primary resi-
dence for at least one year.”). 
 182. NY RENT & EVICT § 2104.5(a)(1). 
 183. April 2013 RURLTA Draft, supra note 1, § 105. “Every duty under this [act] and 
every act that must be performed as a condition precedent to the exercise of a right or remedy 
under this [act] imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.” Id. 
Good faith is defined as “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial stand-
ards of fair dealing.” Id. § 102(20). URLTA has a similar overall good faith requirement. 
UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD &TENANT ACT §§ 1.301(4), 1.302. 
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The Edwards v. Habib court acknowledged that a tenant is not “entitled 
to remain in possession in perpetuity.”184 Subsection 901(c)(6) of the April 
2013 RURLTA draft clearly permits a landlord to “evict [a tenant] for any 
legal reason or for no reason at all,”185 as long as the landlord’s motives are 
not retaliatory in nature. Under that subsection, a landlord need only give 
the tenant any required notice to vacate “before the tenant engaged in an 
activity described in subsection (a).”186  
However, inclusion of subsection 901(c)(8) in RURLTA would suggest 
that a landlord who has retaliatory motives may terminate a tenancy under 
the guise of moving in. One could argue that the landlord is bound by the 
overall duty of good faith found in section 105.187 Unlike subsection 
901(c)(6), subsection 901(c)(8) has no restrictive language, other than a 
landlord’s desire that the property be occupied by himself or his family.188 
Because the Drafting Committee excluded from the latter any specific pro-
hibition against retaliatory motives, it would seem that the duty of good faith 
applies only to a landlord’s affirmative action of personally occupying the 
premises. Thus, a landlord would be permitted to repossess the property 
notwithstanding any retaliatory motives. Otherwise, if a landlord had purely 
good motives, a landlord could rely on subsection 901(c)(6) to terminate the 
tenancy. 
D. Policy Issues 
Should a tenant, who has complied with all the terms of her lease, not 
have the right to remain on the leased premises beyond foreclosure, sale of 
the property, or the landlord’s desire to move in? Should RURLTA provide 
rights and remedies for tenants caught in these “no-fault” situations?  
URLTA is a “model” act on which a number of states have based their 
landlord-tenant law.189 As a specific objective, URLTA intended to remove 
“the landlord and tenant relationship from the constraints of property law 
and establish[] it on the basis of contract law with all the concomitant rights 
and remedies.”190 “No-fault” eviction statutes would be counterproductive to 
this goal. Rather than abiding by the fundamental contract principle that 
parties are bound to comply with the terms of a valid agreement and the 
fundamental property principle that a landlord is required to give possession 
to the tenant for the duration of the lease term, “no-fault” evictions would 
  
 184. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d at 702. 
 185. Id. at 699. 
 186. April 2013 RURLTA Draft, supra note 1, § 901(c)(6). 
 187. Id. § 105. 
 188. See id. § 901(c)(6), (8). 
 189. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 190. Legislative Fact Sheet, supra note 5. 
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basically allow landlords to treat their lease arrangement as tenancies at 
will—permitting unilateral termination of a valid lease agreement. Yet, 
RURLTA seeks to abolish tenancies at will.191 
“No-fault” evictions erode the principles of security of tenure. Hard-
ships to families who would face “no-fault” evictions cannot be overstated. 
A displaced tenant may not have the financial resources to move else-
where.192 Displacement may trigger loss of employment if a tenant cannot 
find replacement housing near her work. An eviction also may affect a ten-
ant’s credit history, which consequently results in the tenant’s inability to 
obtain other housing, employment, or credit.193  
Evictions are not only financially costly but also are psychologically 
and socially taxing. Studies have shown that uprooting a tenant from her 
community may result in severe mental issues.194 Evictions of families with 
children can have a negative impact on a child’s education, as it may require 
changing schools.195 Permitting “no-fault” evictions would likely serve to 
increase the number of displaced tenants and would likely continue to dis-
proportionately affect women, minorities, and the poor.196 
Yet, one may argue that a landlord should have the freedom to use or 
dispose of property that she owns where safeguards put in place by the gov-
ernment are met. States generally impose a good faith requirement in the 
  
 191. September 2012 RURLTA Draft, supra note 1, § 201 cmt.; January 2013 RURLTA 
Draft, supra note 1, § 201 cmt.; April 2013 RURLTA Draft, supra note 1, § 201 cmt. 
 192. Stop Shutting the Door on Renters, supra note 98, at 245 n.20 and accompanying 
text. 
 193. See D. James Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak & Jonathan, The Limits of Un-
bundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in a Massachusetts District Court and Pro-
spects for the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 901, 914 (2013) (“A court-ordered eviction, particu-
larly one for nonpayment of rent, can affect a tenant's credit rating and thereby the tenant's 
access to the credit and rental markets after the eviction.”).  
 194. Stanislav V. Kasl, Physical and Mental Health Effects of Involuntary Relocation and 
Institutionalization on the Elderly, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (Mar. 1972), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1530073/pdf/amjph00725-0059.pdf. But see 
Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. 
L. REV. 1093, 1115 (2009) (“If homes are critical to human flourishing, as personhood theory 
suggests, we would expect to see psychological studies finding long-term mental health 
harms from involuntary relocation. The research suggests otherwise. Psychologists and soci-
ologists have studied the mental health impacts of relocation extensively. The weight of the 
evidence indicates that residential mobility, even forced relocation, causes short-term stress 
but typically does not affect long-term psychological functioning. In general, people are 
highly adaptive to geographic change and typically return to pre-mobility levels of satisfac-
tion in relatively short order.”). 
 195. See generally Rebecca Cohen & Keith Wardrip, Should I Stay or Should I Go?: 
Exploring the Effects of Housing Instability and Mobility on Children, CTR. FOR HOUSING 
POL’Y (Feb. 2011), available at www.nhc.org/media/files/HsgInstablityandMobility.pdf. 
 196. See generally supra Part III. 
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landlord-tenant relationship.197 In instances of “no-fault” eviction, this re-
quirement would need to be particularly emphasized. 
For example, federal and state laws do not impose a good faith re-
quirement when a tenant is evicted as a consequence of a foreclosure and the 
purchaser at foreclosure wishes to occupy the property; generally, the stat-
utes only refer to a purchaser’s intent to occupy the premises as her primary 
residence.198 But who is enforcing compliance with the intent requirement? 
Will intent always result in actual occupancy as a residence? Unfortunately, 
most governmental agencies simply do not have the resources to devote to 
policing the execution of this policy. 
Adequate notice to the tenant of the termination of the lease is a factor 
that generally mitigates arguments of unfairness or hardship. Recognizing 
the inconvenience to tenants, several states and municipalities have required 
a minimum sixty-days’ notice for “no-fault” evictions,199 thus providing 
tenants time to find a new place to live.200 These arguments ignore the fact 
that  
time is not the only issue confronting these tenants. Ninety days (or even 
longer) may not be sufficient time for tenants to come up with the finan-
cial resources required to effectuate a move into comparable housing. . . . 
[T]he law may simply be giving tenants more time in their current prem-
ises with nowhere to go when they are eventually evicted.201 
Arguments in favor of “no-fault” eviction could be buttressed if legisla-
tion provided monetary assistance for relocating tenants. For example, the 
  
 197. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-9A-142 (2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.44 (2013); OKLA. 
STAT. tit 41, § 107 (2012). 
 198. See, e.g., PTFA § 702; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186A, § 2 (2008). 
 199. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1946.1 (2013) (sixty days notice, generally, and thirty 
days for tenancies of less than year); D.C. CODE §§ 42-3505.01(d)–3505.01(e) (2013) (ninety 
days notice in advance of action for repossession).  
 200. When California increased its statutory notice period from thirty to sixty days, evi-
dence was introduced showing that the extended timeframe saves landlords money by elimi-
nating the need to file eviction proceedings, as most tenants will move when given enough 
time to do so. 60-Day Notice for No-Fault Evictions Now Permanent, SANTA MONICA RENT 
CONTROL BOARD, http://www.smgov.net/Departments/Rent_Control/Information_and_FAQ 
/Newsletters/60-Day_Notice_for_No-Fault_Evictions_Now_Permanent.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2013). 
 201. Stop Shutting the Door on Renters, supra note 98, at 253–254 (noting that a move to 
another leased premises will generally require a security deposit in addition to first and last 
months’ rent). In the current economic climate with a depressing job market, two months 
may not be sufficient time to find a new job. See, e.g., US Weekly Jobless Claims Rise More 
Than Expected, REUTERS (Feb 21, 2013), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02 
/21/idUSLNSLDE92120130221. Furthermore, in some cases, tenants are subject to a shorter 
notice period. For example, a tenant with a lease for less than one year does not receive the 
benefit of California’s sixty-day notice rule for evictions. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1946.1. 
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Santa Monica Municipal Code (in the context of rent control) provides relo-
cation assistance for tenants, including those evicted because the landlord 
repossessed the property for occupancy by the landlord or her family.202 In 
2011, amounts ranged from $7,800.00 for a single bedroom to $16,300.00 
for two or more bedroom apartments.203 If the displaced tenant were a senior 
citizen or a disabled person, she would obtain an augmented amount be-
tween $8,900.00 and $18,750.00.204 Tenants in the District of Columbia may 
also receive similar monetary assistance.205 But, these payment amounts may 
be inadequate where the tenant is forced to accept housing in distances far-
ther than where he was residing or in an area that is more costly. In addition, 
relocation assistance is typically paid on a per unit basis as opposed to per 
occupant basis.206 Thus, any such assistance generally neglects to account 
for other members in the tenant’s household.207 
Notice provisions and modest legal remedies cannot cure the extreme 
hardships that tenants experience as a result of “no-fault” evictions. Most 
tenants may not be in a financial position to assert their legal rights and ob-
tain legal remedies. Most tenants face evictions without legal representation, 
  
 202. SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 4.36.020 (2013), available at  
http://qcode.us/codes/santamonica/. 
 203. Id. § 4.36.040. 
 204. Id.; see also S.F., CAL. RESIDENTIAL RENT STABILIZATION AND ARBITRATION 
ORDINANCE ch. 37, § 9C (2013) (“Tenants Rights to Relocation for No-Fault Evictions”). 
 205. D.C. CODE § 42-3507.03 (2013). Some have noted that other remedial statutes, such 
as TOPA, work out to be a monetarily valuable benefit to tenants. As the D.C. Court of Ap-
peals aptly stated, under TOPA, tenants 
“receive a significant and tangible benefit from the legislation. As a result of the 
statute’s enactment,” . . . tenants “have something of value—assignable TOPA 
rights [of first refusal]—for which a prospective assignee is likely to be willing 
to pay, and in many cases has paid, in order to acquire the property.” 
. . . [I]t “strengthen[s] the bargaining position of tenants . . . .” 
Richman Towers Tenants’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Richman Towers, 17 A.3d 590, 619 (D.C. 2011) 
(citations omitted).  
In many cases, especially involving buildings with many tenants, tenants have 
sold their rights to developers. In exchange for these tenant rights, the new de-
veloper converts the property into a condominium or a cooperative. The devel-
oper gives cash to each tenant who decides to vacate the property or a substantial 
discount if that tenant opts to purchase a unit. 
Benny L. Kass, D.C. Landlords Must Give Tenants a Chance to Buy Property, WASH. POST, 
July 17, 2004, at F03, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A54955-
2004Jul16.html. 
 206. See, e.g., Kass, supra note 205.  
 207. For example, where a tenant and her spouse have to move to a new location that 
does not make sharing a vehicle feasible, they may have to purchase a new vehicle or pay 
additional transportation costs; the modest amounts allowed for in relocation statutes may not 
be sufficient to offset these added expenses. However, additional compensation may be given 
when the tenant lives with a minor child. See SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 4.36.040. 
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thus having a greater likelihood of losing their case.208 Parties who are repre-
sented by legal counsel in court generally obtain better results against those 
that are acting pro se.209 Low-income families often encounter difficulties in 
securing legal representation in eviction actions.210 The disparate financial 
position of the parties creates an unfair advantage in favor of landlords, who 
will most likely be able to afford legal counsel and secure better results. 
Another troubling and pressing factor is to what extent tenants are 
aware of, or understand, their rights under protective eviction statutes such 
as PTFA.211 Safeguards may be bypassed because there is arguably no gov-
ernmental institutional supervision and limited means by which tenants may 
enforce their rights, thereby permitting the exploitation of those socially and 
economically disadvantaged tenants, whom these provisions intend to pro-
tect. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
There are arguments both for and against “no-fault” evictions. Some 
may posit that landlords should be able to evict tenants on “no-fault” bases 
for economic and equitable reasons. A landlord who is offered a fair or 
above-market price for his unit, and who stands to profit from a sale to a 
third party who wants to occupy the premises, should not be restricted from 
doing so. Additionally, there are conceivably a number of reasons why a 
landlord may need to move back into the leased premises. Perhaps the land-
lord or a member of her family becomes unemployed, is unable to meet her 
living expenses, and needs to move back to avoid homelessness. Similarly, 
the landlord may need to re-occupy the leased premises to be in closer prox-
imity to an ailing parent or sibling. 
However, equity compels that the scale tip in favor of the tenant when 
balancing a landlord’s autonomy against societal goals. One cannot escape 
the fact that unexpected involuntary relocations may be an economic and 
emotional burden.212  
  
 208. Hartman, supra note 26, at 477. 
 209. Id. 
 210. See Desmond, supra note 20, at 123 (stating that “increased access to free legal 
counsel would decrease evictions.”).  
 211. See RENTERS IN FORECLOSURE, supra note 57, at 9–10. 
 212. See supra notes 169–172 and accompanying text. Such personal hardship includes, 
but is not limited to: economic loss, time loss, physical and emotional stress, and in some 
cases severe emotional trauma, illness, homelessness or other irreparable harm resulting from 
strain of eviction controversy; relocation search and moving difficulties; anxiety caused by 
lack of information, uncertainty, and resultant planning difficulty; employment, education, 
family and social disruption; relocation and empty unit security hazards; relocation to prem-
ises of less affordability, capacity, accessibility and physical or environmental quality; and 
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It is in the public interest of the State to maintain for citizens the 
broadest protections available under State eviction laws to avoid such 
displacement and resultant loss of affordable housing, which, due to 
housing’s uniqueness as the most costly and difficult to change necessity 
of life, causes overcrowding, unsafe and unsanitary conditions, blight, 
burdens on community services, wasted resources, homelessness, emi-
gration from the State and personal hardship, which is particularly severe 
for vulnerable seniors, the disabled, the frail, minorities, large families 
and single parents.213 
Moreover, the integrity of contract rights suggests disallowing “no-fault” 
evictions. The challenge for the Drafting Committee in drafting RURLTA, 
and for legislators, will be to provide a fair method when addressing this 
issue. 
As to foreclosures, RURLTA should consider adopting provisions sim-
ilar to those found in the PTFA and similar legislation.214 A lease should 
survive a foreclosure of leased property, without exception.215 The lease 
should continue for the duration of the lease term. If, however, the lease 
subject to foreclosure would have allowed the tenant to remain on the prop-
erty for several more years, the proposal could limit the lease after foreclo-
sure to a one-year term. Although this may effectuate an early termination of 
longer-term leases, it provides an equitable remedy for both parties.  
On the other hand, if the lease subject to foreclosure has a short term 
remaining on the lease (e.g., 45 days), the proposal may allow the tenant 
additional time if the tenant had previously renewed the lease on a year-to-
year basis or where there was otherwise a reasonable expectation of renew-
al. All such protective measures should apply only to bona fide tenants, i.e., 
tenants who entered into arms’ length lease agreements. RURLTA may con-
sider adopting the term bona fide as defined under the PTFA.216 
A lease should likewise survive the sale of the leased premises to a 
third party. First, a prospective purchaser presumably should have implied 
notice of the existing lease. Second, under fundamental property principles, 
a property owner cannot convey more than he has. Therefore, when a land-
lord sells leased property, he conveys subject to any existing lease. Thus, 
  
relocation adjustment problems, particularly of the blind or other disabled citizens. N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2A:18–61.1a(e) (2013). 
 213. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18–61.1a(d). 
 214. Sheila Crowley, President and CEO of the National Low Income Housing Coalition, 
was quoted as stating the following in regards to the PTFA: “Extending [it] now and giving it 
teeth is the most important things we can do to keep renters in their homes [through] foreclo-
sures.” Bill Introduced to Make PTFA Permanent, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COAL. (Dec. 
9, 2011), available at http://nlihc.org/article/bill-introduced-make-ptfa-permanent. 
 215. RURLTA should not include the exception in PTFA that terminates the lease if the 
purchaser in foreclosure intends to occupy the premises. 
 216. See PTFA, supra note 104, § 702(a)(2)(A). 
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RURLTA should not permit eviction under these circumstances. Of course, 
some landlords might wish to circumvent this by including an express provi-
sion in the lease that the lease terminates upon the sale of the property to a 
third party. To prevent such occurrences, it is recommended that any such 
provision in a residential lease be unenforceable. A landlord who entered 
into a lease agreement (often a one-sided agreement generally drafted by the 
landlord with little or no tenant input) should not be able to unilaterally re-
scind that agreement. Tenants should be permitted to obtain the benefit of 
the bargain. Thus, tenants who comply with lease terms would be able to 
remain on the premises with all of the rights and obligations under their ex-
isting leases.217 
Likewise, RURLTA should also prohibit a landlord from terminating a 
tenancy and evicting a tenant for the purpose of occupying the premises if 
the landlord has retaliatory motives. “[F]or reasons of public policy, such an 
eviction cannot be permitted.”218 
RURLTA should provide for a private cause of action, allowing tenants 
to sue in the event of a violation of these provisions in order to prevent land-
lords from circumventing the provisions protecting tenants in foreclosures, 
and prohibiting the termination of leases for sale or re-occupancy. Addition-
ally, it is recommended that monetary penalties be imposed where new 
owners or landlords act in bad faith. Regulating “no-fault” evictions ensures 
against erosion of one of URLTA’s initial goals—the security of tenure for 
tenants.219 
 
  
 217. Nothing in these prohibitions prevents a landlord, who wishes to terminate the lease 
to personally occupy it or sell it, from negotiating with the tenant. The landlord could always 
offer to buy out the remaining term of the tenant’s lease. 
 218. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d at 699. 
 219. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
